tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post7453858069696062510..comments2024-03-05T11:44:26.154-08:00Comments on The New Theological Movement: "Without me you can do nothing" - What Calvinists and Jesuits don't understand about divine providenceFather Ryan Erlenbushhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comBlogger63125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-38137621815042435522012-05-14T17:37:48.570-07:002012-05-14T17:37:48.570-07:00Father, I do like your statement that God's ca...Father, I do like your statement that God's causality and man's are not competing with each other. But it is not consistent with Thomism. We ought to go even farther and say that God's causality is of a completely different sort than man's causality, on a completely higher plane, which I think is implied by the "first cause"/"second cause" distinction. This is true in human relations just as much as in the physical world (where God truly does sustain and create the world, but He is not just another gear in the chain of physical causes). This means we truly are autonomously free, which I have always understood to be regarded as heresy by Thomists (and also by Fr. William Most, whose book was my introduction to the topic).<br /><br />And therefore there is no predestination AT ALL. We are free to accept or reject divine grace. The notion that "sufficient grace" is not actually sufficient at all without "efficacious grace" is pure sophistry - if it's not sufficent, then it's not sufficient and we have no need for it at all. If God is the cause of our freedom, then we are truly free - He cannot physically move us to perform a free act of His choosing. Nobody is predestined to Heaven; if so then God would be a wicked God for not predestining us all to Heaven, since even those "predestined" to Heaven are still free in the same sense that anyone else is. I left the Roman Catholic Church for the Byzantine Catholic Church because I cannot accept such a bald logical contradiction.Seraphimhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00147139664156379333noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-62330537226576917922012-05-10T06:15:04.939-07:002012-05-10T06:15:04.939-07:00On the one hand we have write-backers bickering ov...On the one hand we have write-backers bickering over the putative untoward influence of the Universal Doctor, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and on the other hand we have the teaching of this Saint-Pope:<br /><br />Pope Saint Pius X: Studiorum Ducem:<br /><br /><i>We so heartily approve the magnificent tribute of praise bestowed upon this most divine genius that We consider that Thomas should be called not only the Angelic, but also the Common or Universal Doctor of the Church; for <b>the Church has adopted his philosophy for her own.</b></i><br /><br /><i><b>We therefore desired that all teachers of philosophy and sacred theology should be warned that if they deviate so much as a step, in metaphysics especially, from Aquinas, they exposed themselves to grave risk.” </b></i><br /><br />Dear Father. Can you please help me solve my problem of whether I ought heed the demurrers or the Saint Pope?Mick Jagger Gathers No Mosquehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12879499915093940176noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-7711393769285605402012-05-10T00:14:24.837-07:002012-05-10T00:14:24.837-07:00john-mark wrote "why need we assume that if G...john-mark wrote "why need we assume that if God doesn’t determine those events that such events would fall outside His providence?"<br /><br /><br />I think that would hinge on what you mean by providence. Certainly it is Catholic dogma (cf. Vatican I) that God's providence governs and directs even the free actions of creatures. The question is understanding this.<br /><br />If God knew what was to happen because He knows you so well, and all the circumstances perfectly, and everything affecting you, etc, then you have no free will. If that is how divine providence interacts with human action, by changing the circumstances, etc., then God is merely flipping different switches in a system that is deterministic, and free will is an illusion.<br /><br />If we admit that what it means to have a will is that it can be otherwise, and hence is not a necessary cause, then we could say, perhaps, that God makes really good estimations. He knows you so well, and the circumstances, that He predicts action. But that wouldn't be infallible and would hardly befit God.<br /><br />We could say God knows because He sees past, present and future all at once. Okay. This is true. But if God's knowledge of my action was dependent upon my choice, as something autonomous and prior in nature to His knowledge, then God becomes a creatur- His knowledge becomes caused and dependent on my choices. <br /><br />As St. Augustine pointed out, the only way that a free cause can be known with certitude and without passivity to it, is to be its cause. In order to have prescience and free will, one needs to have God as agent in the picture.<br /><br />On a more basic level, we recognize that God is (among other things) first mover, first agent. All that is is from Him. Hence even the act of the will must be cause by God. If any act, whether of the will or of a dog, or of the planets, did not have God as the first cause, we would be radically denying the nature of God and creation. Every act, here and now, is caused by God...both in effect and in modality. Free effects through free causes, and necessary through necessary and chance and so on. This gets into the key doctrine of Thomists of analogical causation. But even Molinists, and in fact every orthodox Catholic thinker, admits that God immediately cooperates in every act of the will, as the first agent. Molinists and Thomists debate on a smaller particular aspect, namely whether the divine motion is ad unum, but all agree that God is a first cause of every act (even the act of sin, but not of sinning) and God is the infallible author of history.<br /><br />We should recognize that, at least this side of the beatific vision, we could never fully comprehend how God is "more in us than we are in ourselves", how "in him we live, and move, and are" to quote Scripture. We do not perceive the motion of grace, not even that natural causation derived from God immediately and experientially here.Stomachosushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09985536970467983132noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-22108468884210861852012-05-09T23:55:45.499-07:002012-05-09T23:55:45.499-07:00Father, there seems to be to many issues connected...Father, there seems to be to many issues connected with both schools of thought (Calvinism or Molinism) for either to be fairly characterized by your post, I believe.<br /><br />The Calvinists I know, who, while they may be a minority in our day, are truly rigorous and scholastic don't differ essentially on the point you are making. In either Thomism or Calvism (or for that matter most Molinists, including Suarez and Bellarmine) we do have uncondition negative reprobation ("passing over", non-election) which is unconditional and founded only on the divine will and positive reprobation which is based on foreseen sins. Calvin explicitly, following Augustine, bases positive reprobation on foreseen sins. There are Calvinists (and there are Thomists!,the 18th century Carmelite Alvarez e.g.) who attempt to ascribe a motive for negative reprobation, e.g. the positive will to exclude from eternal glory, but among the Calvinist tradition this isn't actually the norm.<br /><br />And as I already said with the Molinists, there is a great number of them who held to unconditional election and negative reprobation, e.g. Suarez. (and, interestingly, this was the "official position" of the Jesuit order back in the day)<br /><br />That said, even in this "Congruist view" I do think your analysis that it is a denial of analogical causality- an attempt to place God and man on a univocal level, and thus partition the space- is correct with Molinism, even in its stricter forms. But I don't think that same objection can, at least so easily, by shown of Calvinism. Within Calvinist circles it is not exactly agreed upon what is meant by irresistable grace (for that matter Tulip is not a universal among Calvinists). Many I know identify themselves within the Augustian-Thomist-Calvinist school, and there understand is like that of efficacious grace, as expounded by traditional Thomism. The crux of the difference being in the doctrine of sufficient grace (as it would be with Jansenists, and in another way with the Jesuits who reinterpreted the meaning of sufficient)<br /><br />The notion that Calvinism entails such an absolute predestinarianism is, I'm afraid, a caricature that doesn't respect, at the very least, the different understandings of Calvin/Calvinism that Calvinists actually have. I certainly don't see a basis for claiming they conceive divine action on a univocal level, at least in a similar way of the MolinistsStomachosushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09985536970467983132noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-8450710108227476382012-05-09T16:51:17.936-07:002012-05-09T16:51:17.936-07:00Re the negative comments about Saint Thomas. Popes...Re the negative comments about Saint Thomas. Popes have repeatedly taught that he must be studied in the seminaries if the Faith is to remain to be taught and understood rightly.<br /><br />I sense a lot of fear that Saint Thomas is making a comeback posy V2 and that is an excellent sign. The New Theologians and the personalists thought they had him buried for good.Mick Jagger Gathers No Mosquehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12879499915093940176noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-37781383740016811892012-05-09T15:11:28.274-07:002012-05-09T15:11:28.274-07:00@JM,
Well, this may not help much, but St. Thomas ...@JM,<br />Well, this may not help much, but St. Thomas gives a very good discussion of the point you are making. [see the citation in my comment above]<br /><br />Indeed, only God is able to be a total cause on the will without removing freedom ... but it is good to note that the theologians are not claiming that God "forces" the will to be free (that wold be an analyitic contradiction in terms) -- but rather that God "causes" the will to be free.<br /><br />We see this most clearly in the case of the saints in heaven.<br />And the reason God can do this is because of the difference between primary and secondary causality ... a difference which both the Jesuits and the Calvinists failed to grasp (as Molina himself admits).<br /><br />Peace! +Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-83232527007626151382012-05-09T09:38:28.534-07:002012-05-09T09:38:28.534-07:00Ha! Well, if you're overly enthusiastic I'...Ha! Well, if you're overly enthusiastic I'm sure most of my friends would tell you I'm overly critical of the greatest saint-scholar who ever lived. So my vice is probably the greater.<br />That being said, I think in philosophy it's usual to distinguish between a cause that produces the effect completely (a determining cause) and a cause which merely contributes(as one factor among many) to an effect. So my comment is not a determining effect of your response, just a contributing cause. Otherwise, your response wouldn't be a free one, would it? Again, it seems to me the question is, does God determine what our free choices will be before we make those choices ourselves?<br />Thanks for taking the time to respond... I really do enjoy the discussion.JMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-28536552354214694272012-05-09T06:46:49.849-07:002012-05-09T06:46:49.849-07:00@John-Mark,
I do understand that many people will ...@John-Mark,<br />I do understand that many people will not accept the Angelic Doctor as an authority ... I only present him on account of the clarity of his thought -- in other words, I do not intend to say "Thomas has spoken, the matter is finished", but rather "Thomas has spoken, let's take a look at what he says, and we might learn something!"<br /><br />That being said, I am sure that my enthusiasm for the Common Doctor is a bit overbearing at times (or even most times!).<br /><br />Still, I did give a very simple example of the difference between a "causing" and "forcing" ... here is another: your comment "caused" me to respond, but your comment most certainly did not "force" me to respond.<br />"to cause" and "to force" are very clearly not the same words ... I don't know why some people think that they are identical.Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-38605981607570596232012-05-08T21:02:52.057-07:002012-05-08T21:02:52.057-07:00Good Father, I think it’s important for you to und...Good Father, I think it’s important for you to understand that for many of your readers, including your faithful Catholic ones, Thomas’ pronouncements are not magisterial, nor should they be treated as such. So, for instance, when you say that “you should be able to recognize that a free action can be ‘caused’ without being ‘forced,’” and then go on to cite a line from the corpus thomisticum, it’s not a very convincing method. Most of us – really, almost all of us – canNOT see how a free action which is wholly determined before the human agent even exists is intelligible. I think it’s your burden – or Thomas’ or Augustine’s or Calvin’s – to make it clear to us precisely how that happens. And remember, it’s not enough just to assert it. You have to show it.<br />Bobby, this is precisely the point where it’s very legitimate to draw attention to the relevant similarities between Aquinas and Calvin, which is that for both it seems that the “free” act has been COMPLETELY determined to be what it is by factors beyond the agent’s control (namely, the divine decision from all eternity). Of course, we all know that on Calvin’s view God sends certain people to hell and on Aquinas’ (or, at least Banez and LaGrange’s version of Aquinas) God does not supply the prerequisite conditions for certain people to get into heaven. But they’re alike in that for both all the person’s actions have been determined prior to (metaphysically) the person actually choosing those actions. <br />Another point: why need we assume that if God doesn’t determine those events that such events would fall outside His providence? If a grandmaster chessplayer goes up against a novice, the former wouldn’t determine the latter’s moves. But we’d still know who is going to win, since the expert can turn all the beginner’s move to his own advantage.John-Markhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05841131228660225695noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-18513633408049528072012-05-08T16:07:08.657-07:002012-05-08T16:07:08.657-07:00@Passerby,
You are wasting our time ... if you are...@Passerby,<br />You are wasting our time ... if you are truly interested in the truth (rather than silly argumentation about whether a man in a wheelchair has free will with respect to rising and walking [and he does not, by the way]), take a look at St. Thomas' excellent discussion of the matter:<br />ST I-II, qq.8-10. Especially important is q.9, a.6 (http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2009.htm#article6)<br /><br />As far as the difference between a thing being "caused" and a thing being "forced" ... a kind word from a friend can be a "cause" for my encouragement, without "forcing" me to be encouraged.<br />My goodness! Is it really that difficult? Why, if "cause" and "force" meant the same thing, I don't think we would have two words which are used in such different ways!Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-84856579692942354192012-05-08T11:47:25.213-07:002012-05-08T11:47:25.213-07:00You introduce following definition:
As far as a d...You introduce following definition:<br /><br /><i>As far as a definition of "freedom": A man is free when he is able to do that which he wills, and when he is not compelled against his will.</i><br /><br />Is this supposed to be the definition of free *will*? This is good for the definition of free *action* according to the will, but not as freedom of will. The question is not what does it mean to act freely according to the will, but what does it mean to *will* freely. To illustrate the problem with this kind of definition, let us consider following statement of yours:<br /><br /><i>However, if the will is drawn to something and man is not able to act -- that may is not free.</i><br /><br />So, let us say I am in a wheelchair unable to move. I want/will to go buy bread for my old grandma, to make life easier for her, but I am not able to act according to my will. Does that mean I don't have free will?!! Do people in wheelchair have free will according to you father?<br /><br />To conclude - no, I still don't see that an action can be "caused" without being "forced", and the example of saints in heaven who must will what they will, and can't will differently, but are still free, is, as far as I am concerned, yet another problematic statement of catholic teaching regarding free will.Passerbynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-46210074409760529282012-05-08T09:48:56.921-07:002012-05-08T09:48:56.921-07:00@Passerby,
There is no reason why an action cannot...@Passerby,<br />There is no reason why an action cannot be caused to be free ... it would be a self-contradiction to say that God "forces" man to act freely ... but you should be able to recognize that an action can be "caused" without being "forced".<br /><br />As far as a definition of "freedom": A man is free when he is able to do that which he wills, and when he is not compelled against his will.<br /><br />Hence, if the will is drawn to something (namely, to a good), and man is able to act as his will moves him -- that man is said to be free and to exercise the freedom of his will.<br /><br />However, if the will is drawn to something and man is not able to act -- that may is not free.<br /><br />Now, God can draw the will to himself as the ultimate and supreme Good. If man is able to act as his will desires, then that man is free -- even if the will is inexorably directed toward God.<br />Thus, even the saints in heaven who cannot NOT love God (because they recognize him as the supreme Good and their wills are wholly ordered toward him) are yet perfectly free --- for they are able to do what they will, and they will to love God. Though they could not will anything else (now that they see God perfectly).<br /><br />So, you asked for an example of free will -- I give you the supreme human example: the saints in heaven, who cannot do anything other than love God, but who are wholly free.<br />[it is a matter of dogma, by the way]<br /><br />Now, if you still cannot see that "causing freedom" is not the same as "a four-angled triangle" ... then I fear that our conversation will never be fruitful.Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-5487881919436424472012-05-08T08:11:49.843-07:002012-05-08T08:11:49.843-07:00Well, father, I must say I am ever more disappoint...Well, father, I must say I am ever more disappointed with your way of making argument. It wouldn't be so disappointing, if this weren't a blog dedicated to reasoning. But when one challenges you to an argument, the best you can do is to say ‘that is ridiculous’?! And compare levels of respect between me and Molinists?! Wow. You really think this kind of 'argument' evokes respect?! No, it doesn't. It just evokes disappointment. Since it is not argument of any kind. <br /><br />Trying to be serious (after this), I must say that it is not ridiculous when I say that those two phrases contain similar contradiction. On the contrary, that is the heart of the problem. Intuitively, freedom does mean not being caused by another will. So, intuitively, when you say that God is omnipotent in a way that he can cause free will, you are actually saying God is omnipotent in a way he can cause something so that it is not caused. That is precisely the same as to say he is omnipotent in a way that he can make a triangle that doesn't have three angles (but for example four) - just replace word 'cause' with 'three' and there you have it. Of course, one can challenge this intuitive definition of free will, and if I recall well, that is precisely what thomists do. Yet, molinists do define it that way, and I agree with them - that is what is intuitively considered under term 'freedom'. Thomistic definition sounded weird to me (I don't recall it, I just recall weirdness). <br /><br />Which bring us to another point - would you be so kind as to define freedom of will to me? You keep saying that God and man are on different level of causality. But you illustrated that different levels of causality with the example of pen, in which example pen can never be considered free since it is moved by hand (i.e. by another will), and with the example of messenger in which example messenger does contribute with his free will so that they (as you say it) compete. Of course, you say that those examples do not serve to illustrate free will. But can you then offer examples that do? Since I don't see how it can be. The will is either moved by another or not. I don't see the third option. The first of your examples falls in first category, and the second to second.Passerbynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-75549313266252839212012-05-08T06:41:04.241-07:002012-05-08T06:41:04.241-07:00...double-predestination makes man to be nothing m...<i>...double-predestination makes man to be nothing more than a donkey, ridden either by Satan into hell or by God into heaven.</i><br /><br />Aptly put.Strossmayernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-25538863358135508482012-05-07T17:15:34.930-07:002012-05-07T17:15:34.930-07:00Father, this is one of the best things you have wr...Father, this is one of the best things you have written, and it is something that I sorely needed to read at the present time.<br /><br />Thank you, and God bless you!<br /><br />VeronicaAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-17699546714572641222012-05-07T15:53:54.708-07:002012-05-07T15:53:54.708-07:00@Passerby,
It is ridiculous for you to say that &q...@Passerby,<br />It is ridiculous for you to say that "God causing a free act" is equal to saying "a four-angled triangle" ... as though there were a logical (and even analytic) contradiction in both phrases.<br /><br />Even the most adamant Molinist would have more respect for the Angelic Doctor than that!<br /><br />But, your real (philosophical) problem is that you are still putting man and God on the same level of causality -- so that they are in competition.<br />This is why you are unable to understand divine providence. +Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-70013938599875140202012-05-07T15:32:34.650-07:002012-05-07T15:32:34.650-07:00Father, you say:
God is omnipotent. He is so powe...Father, you say:<br /><br /><i>God is omnipotent. He is so powerful that he can not only cause human actions, he can even cause them to be free.</i><br /><br />Now, I must ask - can God make a triangle with four angles? Or can God make a stone so heavy that even he cannot lift it? As far as I know, the standard answer to these questions is that omnipotence of God does not cover illogical things. God being omnipotent does not mean he can do contradictory things. But here, in this passage I quoted, you say that very thing - that God's omnipotence means he can do contradictory things. For, if free will means precisely not being caused by alien will, you are saying that God can cause something in way that it is not caused. Which is equivalent of a triangle with four angles. But, as I recall reading thomists and molinists on this topic, there is not even a clear definition what a free will is. They define it differently. Which is fantastic, isn't it. I mean, having such important notion, but not really knowing what it means...Passerbynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-10193219776538284832012-05-07T07:01:09.937-07:002012-05-07T07:01:09.937-07:00@Fr Renic, sj (CroJesuit),
I suspect that there mu...@Fr Renic, sj (CroJesuit),<br />I suspect that there must be some language problem here ... for I most certainly DID NOT give this as a homily at Mass (nor did I ever indicate such). <br />No, I can hardly imagine a situation in which I would find if fruitful to bring up such distinctions explicitly in a sermon.<br /><br />As to your claim that people who read this article will think that I present the Jesuits as heretics ... only a careless reader would come away with that conclusion:<br /><br />In the opening paragraphs, I write, "Certainly, the Jesuits are not semi-Pelagian heretics"<br /><br />And again, when discussing Molina: "While THE JESUITS ARE CLOSER TO THE RIGHT ANSWER (since they do not explicitly deny either free will or God’s providence), their theory is much less philosophically rigorous than that proposed by John Calvin."<br /><br />In any case, your claim that I have a dislike for the Jesuits (as though it is personal) is quite disingenuous -- we are brother priests, let us not make the matter so petty.<br /><br />[perhaps you are unaware of the fact that I regularly cite Fr. Cornelius a Lapide, sj as the greatest Catholic biblical scholar]Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-6660581072267598402012-05-07T04:52:45.472-07:002012-05-07T04:52:45.472-07:00JM,
To expand upon Fr Ryan's comment, the pro...JM,<br /><br />To expand upon Fr Ryan's comment, the problem with Van Inwagen's claim is that it indeed lumps together Thomism and Calvinism, failing to understand the Thomistic doctrine on its own terms. My understanding of the Thomistic doctrine (and please remove this post, Fr Ryan if I am in error) concerning the question you raise is that God is the primary cause of our sin in so far as before the foundation of the world, God grants us permission to choose to disobey him. That is the key distinction. Then, once we have been given permission to be allowed to choose against God, that choice becomes 100% our own. Thus, we see in the Thomistic doctrine that the reason we sin is PRECISELY because we choose to partake of that particular action 100% out of our own free will because God's part in this is granting us permission to do so. God love you.Bobby Bambinohttp://www.jillstanek.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-31287230795783620482012-05-07T04:06:32.570-07:002012-05-07T04:06:32.570-07:00Beautiful post. I could never have come very far i...Beautiful post. I could never have come very far in understanding good and evil without Jacques Maritain, personally.<br /><br /><br />As regards the discussion of God being a "cause" (or not) of evil actions, could it perhaps be put this way? Could we not return again to the Gospel reading?<br /><br />He's the cause of what's good (human activity, use of faculties, etc.). But evil itself is not a thing. Evil is a deprivation. Evil is "no thing". That's exactly what we do without God: no thing! "Without God we can do nothing, we can do no thing." <br /><br />It all comes back to the same line of the Gospel, in terms of both good and evil. What we do with God as first cause is good and is a thing. What we ourselves initiate by breaking God's initiated good acts is, or contains, evil and is not a thing (or contains deprivation, an "amount" of nothingness).<br /><br />Just hoping this comment helps clarify and refocus again on the excellent points made in the original post.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-66598759608488218402012-05-06T23:28:07.202-07:002012-05-06T23:28:07.202-07:00Dear Fr Erlenbush, I find it odd enough to see tha...Dear Fr Erlenbush, I find it odd enough to see that you discuss such a highly sophisticated theological topic in a homily. But what I find worrying is putting in the same context a heretical doctrine and a fully orthodox one. I am afraid an ordinary listener or reader of your homily would remember only one thing: the Jesuits are heretics as much as the Calvinists. I hope that wasn't your intention. <br /><br />Anyway, this article deserves an apology to the Jesuits because, first, the ancient "Jesuit" position is fully orthodox and does not deserve to be treated as a heretical one. Second, many recent Jesuit theologians have had a different opinion (e.g. Karl Rahner considered the "Dominican" solution better). Please, find another topic to express your dislike of the Jesuits (there are more serious and more recent issues indeed).<br />Fr Dalibor Renic SJ (Croatia)CroJesuithttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14070274898376538869noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-74746201319477828752012-05-06T14:38:47.561-07:002012-05-06T14:38:47.561-07:00@JM,
I find both Most and Journet to be very helpf...@JM,<br />I find both Most and Journet to be very helpful in this discussion ... but, alas, in a simple blog-post I did not find it profitable to include them.<br /><br />However, I must bristle against your way of lumping Sts. Augustine and Thomas in with Calvin ... as though their THREE theories on grace/freedom are identical -- truthfully, it is a bit blasphemous for you to speak of the Doctor of Grace and the Common Doctor as being forerunners of the heretical Calvinist doctrine.<br /><br />Distinctions! We need distinctions!<br />And the point of this article is to show that Calvin (and the Jesuits) do not make the proper distinction between primary and secondary causality.<br />Fr. Luis de Molina explicitly states that he does not understand what Thomas means by "secondary causes".<br /><br />Regarding the ability to reject grace ... this is an important point which St. Thomas makes, but which St. Augustine (occasionally) obscured. +Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-86261408830852817392012-05-06T14:33:29.202-07:002012-05-06T14:33:29.202-07:00@hurdur,
It would be absurd to state that God is t...@hurdur,<br />It would be absurd to state that God is the cause of evil ... and I most certainly never said that he was/is.<br />Please do not claim that I have said the very thing I explicitly rejected ... namely, that God causes evil.<br /><br />Rather, God (as the first Cause and unmoved Mover) is the primary cause of all actions -- even evil actions; but he does not cause them to be evil, he is the cause of whatever in them is good (the defect, which is a lack of being, is due to the human/angelic will).<br /><br />To claim that God is not in any way a cause of those actions which involve sin would mean that those acts are separated from God ... which would lead to the disastrous conclusion that sinful actions are wholly outside of the divine providence and therefore that God is not truly the Lord of all, but only the Lord of the just. +Father Ryan Erlenbushhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07557817305024750902noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-64628107951496599482012-05-06T11:44:32.674-07:002012-05-06T11:44:32.674-07:00A related post might have been "What disciple...A related post might have been "What disciples of Thomas, Augustine, and Calvin aren't willing to admit about human freedom."<br /> Van Inwagen has pointed out that we would hold no one responsible for actions which were determined COMPLETELY by factors beyond that person's control. But for most of the schools surrounding Thomas'/Augustine's/Calvin's treatment of grace/free will, ALL our actions are determined completely by God's providential decision -- over which we ourselves exercise no control. So their accounts of the matter seem to do away with human responsibility altogether. <br />Now apologists for divine determinism always assert that there is no incompatibility between an act being determined and an act being free. Of course, you admit an act can't be free if it's determined by other factors, but you assure us that as long as God is the one determining the act, the act can still be free. You want to give God the one exception -- only He can determine an act while still leaving the agent responsible for it. But divine determinists provide no grounds for that assertion. They just assert it. Or, every now and then, they appeal to notions like "divine transcendence" or "the mystery of God's unique causality."But when they use words like "transcendence" or "mystery," it indicates that they've come to the end of their intellectual rope, as it were. They can't explain themselves, so they try to legitimize the unintelligibility of their position with these theological words. Better, I think, just to abandon their stance.<br />But one needn't turn to Molina as the only alternative.<br />Maritain, Pontifex, Most, Journet, Burrell, say simply that while God's grace cannot be accepted without divine aid, His grace can be resisted. The one thing a creature can do without God's help is reject Him. This makes sense of human experience, of the blessed Mother, and of the Scriptures in general -- without, by the way, having the unpleasant conclusion that God, prior to making certain people, decides that He doesn't want them in heaven.JMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5578980753063154388.post-77492445433063859122012-05-06T08:43:18.308-07:002012-05-06T08:43:18.308-07:00I am so happy about the renaissance of liturgical ...I am so happy about the renaissance of liturgical and theological life back into the Church.<br /><br />That being said, I think two of the greatest temptations of those who are traditionally minded is to slip into arrogance or nostalgia. <br /><br />While Thomas' construal of grace + free will has a lot that is commendable to it, I don't think it works for a reason you seem happy to embrace, it makes God the author of evil. You should actually respond to Mr. S. Ellis as his critique is the right one here. <br /><br />While I love St. Thomas and the schools, their arrogant certainties, and certain arrogance, is frustrating at times. The pillar and ground of our faith is not merely Thomas Dixit Father.hurrrrrrrdurrrrhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02995548954959808126noreply@blogger.com